

Message Text

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FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3189

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 ANKARA 2904

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DEPARTMENT PASS ATHENS AND NICOSIA AS DESIRED

FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MASS, PFOR, CY, GR, TU

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH FONMIN CAGLAYANGIL

REF: ANKARA 2892

1. THE FOLLOWING IS A MORE DETAILED REPORT OF MY APRIL 13
MEETING WITH FONMIN CAGLAYANGIL (REFTEL).

2. CAGLAYANGIL BEGAN BY EXPRESSING APPRECIATION FOR THE
SECRETARY'S MESSAGE ON THE BITSIOS VISIT (STATE 87644). HE
SAID THAT WHILE HE HAD PREPARED A FORMAL REPLY (REFTEL), HE
WANTED TO EXPAND ON THIS AND LET ME HAVE HIS FURTHER PERSONAL
THOUGHTS ON THE ISSUES INVOLVED. HE REFERRED TO TURKISH
INTERNAL CRITICISM OF HIMSELF FOR SIGNING THE AGREEMENT AND
SAID THAT HE WAS NOT IN ANY WAY SORRY THAT HE HAD SIGNED
BECAUSE THE AGREEMENT WAS IN THE INTEREST OF HIS COUNTRY.
HOWEVER, HE DECLARED, THE BIGGEST SURPRISE FOR HIM WAS "THE
REACTION OF THAT EXPERIENCED STATESMAN, GREEK PRIMIN
CARAMANLIS," AFTER TWO NATO ALLIES HAD IRONED OUT THEIR
DIFFICULTIES AND WERE ATTEMPTING TO REPAIR WEAKNESSES IN
NATO'S SOUTHEASTERN FLANK. HE ASSERTED THAT "ONE HAS TO BE
CRAZY" TO THINK THAT TURKEY HAS AGGRESSIVE DESIGNS ON GREEK
ISLANDS IN THE AEGEAN. REFERRING TO DEPUTY PRIMIN TURKES'

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REMAKRS ON THE AEGEAN ISSUE WHICH THE GREEKS HAD FOUND

OBJECTIONABLE, HE SAID HE WAS SORRY THAT THE REMARKS WERE MADE, BUT THAT THERE IS NO LANGUAGE IN THE GOVERNMENT'S OFFICIAL PROGRAM -- WHICH IS THE BASIS FOR THE FOUR-PARTY COALITION -- SUGGESTING DESIGNS ON AEGEAN ISLANDS. HE SAID THE GOVERNMENT COULD BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR STATEMENTS ON FOREIGN POLICY BY THE PRIME MINISTER OR BY HIMSELF, BUT IT COULD NOT BE BLAMED FOR STATEMENTS MADE BY MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT SPEAKING AS PARTY LEADERS.

3. CAGLAYANGIL NOTED THAT GREEK REACTION HAD HAD A POSITIVE EFFECT IN TURKEY IN THE SENSE THAT TURKISH OPPONENTS OF THE AGREEMENT HAD BEEN SHOWN THAT GREECE WOULD NOT HAVE REACTED AS IT DID IF THE AGREEMENT WERE BAD FOR TURKEY. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE SAID, THE GREEK REACTION MADE IT EVEN MORE IMPERATIVE THAT CONGRESS ENDORSE THE AGREEMENT.

4. TURNING TO THE GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO SUBMIT THE AGREEMENT TO THE TURKISH PARLIAMENT, CAGLAYANGIL SAID THAT INITIALLY THE GOVERNMENT HAD NOT HAD ANY SUCH INTENTION NOR WAS THERE A CONSTITUTIONAL NECESSITY FOR RATIFICATION BY THE PARLIAMENT BUT, HE SAID, THE GOVERNMENT HAD DECIDED THAT A PUBLIC DEBATE IN PARLIAMENT WAS INEVITABLE. THE GOVERNMENT OTHERWISE WOULD HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO REPLY IN PARLIAMENT WHEN THE OPPOSITION RAISED CRITICISMS OF THE AGREEMENT, AND IT WOULD FURTHERMORE HAVE ALLOWED THE OPPOSITION TO CHOOSE THE OPPORTUNE TIME TO ATTACK THE AGREEMENT. THE DECISION TO TAKE THE AGREEMENT TO PARLIAMENT HAS PLEASED TURKISH PUBLIC OPINION, HE SAID.

5. CAGLAYANGIL THEN WENT ON TO STRESS THAT, JUST AS IN OUR CONGRESSIONAL SITUATION, HE WAS AFRAID THAT ACTIONS MIGHT BE TAKEN ELSEWHERE THAT WOULD IMPEDE THE AGREEMENT'S PROGRESS THROUGH THE TURKISH PARLIAMENT. HE POINTED OUT THAT ONE OF HIS MAIN ARGUMENTS SINCE HIS RETURN FROM WASHINGTON HAS BEEN THAT IN THE AGREEMENT, THE LINKAGE BETWEEN CYPRUS AND US SECURITY ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN SEVERED. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT IN YOUR MESSAGE HE HAD "SNIFFED THE POSSIBILITY" THAT THIS SAME LINKAGE HAS BEEN RECREATED.

6. UNLIKE THE GREEK GOVERNMENT, CAGLAYANGIL STRESSED,
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THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT WAS PLEASED TO SEE THAT A SIMILAR AGREEMENT WOULD BE SIGNED BETWEEN THE US AND ANOTHER NATO ALLY, AND IT CONSIDERED THAT THE OTHER AGREEMENT WOULD REINFORCE THE SOUTHEASTERN FLANK OF NATO. HOWEVER, IT HAD TO BE BORNE IN MIND THAT GREECE WAS A COUNTRY OF EIGHT MILLION (SIC) PEOPLE WHILE TURKEY HAD A POPULATION OF FORTY ONE (SIC) MILLION. HE SAID HE WOULD FEEL VERY WORRIED IF THIS PROPORTION WERE NOT TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION.

HOWEVER, WHEN I PICKED HIM UP ON USING THIS POPULATION DIFFERENCE AS THE BASIS FOR AID, HE BACKED AWAY AND READ THE LANGUAGE IN HIS FORMAL REPLY WHICH REFERS TO "THE SIZE OF THE ARMED FORCES" AND "THE MISSIONS ENTRUSTED TO THEM." HE THEN ADDED THAT HE WOULD BE LESS CONCERNED IF THE GREEK AID QUESTION HAD ARISEN AFTER THE US-TURKISH AGREEMENT HAD BEEN ENDORSED BY BOTH OUR LEGISLATURES.

7. CAGLAYANGIL NEXT REFERRED TO THE PORTION OF THE SECRETARY'S MESSAGE MENTIONING THAT CYPRUS WILL BE DISCUSSED DURING BITSIOS' VISIT. "NOW I CAN SEE THE HEADLINES IN THE TURKISH PRESS." HE SAID. " 'KISSINGER DISCUSSES SECRET AGREEMENT HE SIGNED WITH CAGLAYANGIL', 'CONCESSIONS MADE BY TURKEY TO THE US WERE EVEN GREATER THAN ANNOUNCED', 'GREECE GETS ALLIT WANTS IN AEGEAN; NOW IT IS CLEAR WHY THE US WAS SO GENEROUS TO TURKEY IN THE AGREEMENT'." HE SAID IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT SUCH IMPLICATIONS COULD MEAN SACRIFICING OUR AGREEMENT AND EXPOSING OUR RELATIONSHIP TO GREAT DAMAGE.

8. WHILE NOTING THAT NO COUNTRY HAS THE RIGHT TO INTERFERE WITH ANOTHER'S RELATIONS WITH A THIRD COUNTRY, HE SAID IT WAS STILL DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO COMPREHEND WHY THE US CONSIDERED IT NECESSARY TO LAUNCH INTO AN AGREEMENT WITH GREECE WITH SUCH URGENCY BEFORE THE US-TURKISH AGREEMENT WAS RATIFIED.

9. CAGLAYANGIL THEN BEGAN A STRONG CRITICISM OF BITSIOS' FAILURE TO FULFILL WHAT HAD BEEN AGREED ON AT BRUSSELS. HE SAID THEY HAD AGREED THAT PROPOSALS ON TERRITORY WOULD BE MADE BY THE GREEK SIDE. THEY HAD ALSO AGREED THAT THE MAIN ISSUES IN THE CYPRUS PROBLEM -- NAMELY TERRITORY, CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES, AND THE POWERS OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT -- WOULD BE TACKLED TOGETHER IN AN INTERIM AGREEMENT.

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IF AGREEMENT PROVED DIFFICULT THEY HAD AGREED TO CONCENTRATE ON ONE ISSUE BUT WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF ARRIVING AT A PACKAGE DEAL. BITSIOS SUBSEQUENTLY HAD "FALSIFIED" THEIR AGREEMENT BY CLAIMING THAT THEY HAD AGREED TO GIVE PRIORITY TO THE TERRITORIAL PROBLEM. IN A RECENT PUBLIC MESSAGE TO BITSIOS, CAGLAYANGIL SAID, HE HAD WRITTEN THAT ALTHOUGH THEY HAD AGREED TO KEEP THEIR AGREEMENT SECRET, THEY SHOULD MAKE IT PUBLIC TO SHOW THE WORLD WHO WAS FALSIFYING IT. BUT INSTEAD OF REPLYING PUBLICLY, BITSIOS HAD SENT HIS AMBASSADOR TO CALL ON CAGLAYANGIL WITH THE REQUEST THAT THEY AVOID PUBLIC ACTION, AND CAGLAYANGIL LET THE MATTER GO. ALSO AT BRUSSELS, CAGLAYANGIL SAID, BITSIOS HAD TOLD HIM THAT THE GOG WAS AWARE OF THE NEGATIVE INFLUENCE OF MAKARIOS BUT ASKED THAT THE GOG COOPERATE IN HELPING CLERIDES. BITSIOS HAD STATED IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THEY CONDUCT AND COMPLETE THE INTERCOMMUNAL

TALKS THROUGH CLERIDES. CAGLAYANGIL HAD RESPONDED THAT HE SHARED BITSIOS' SENTIMENTS ABOUT CLERIDES, BUT THAT THE GOT WOULD NOT FEEL SECURE UNTIL MAKARIOS WAS REPLACED. NOW, CAGLAYANGIL SAID, A SUCCESSFUL PLOT HAD BEEN CARRIED OUT FORCING CLERIDES TO RESIGN AND NOT ONE EXPRESSION OF REGRET HAD COME OUT OF ATHENS. THE REMOVAL OF CLERIDES FORCED OUT DENKTASH AS WELL FROM THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS. CLERIDES' REPLACEMENT, PAPADOPOULOS, WAS AN EXTREMIST, AND DENKTASH'S REPLACEMENT, OREK, HAS AN EQUALLY MILITANT CHARACTER. HE FORECAST THAT THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE ABLE TO WITHSTAND THIS STRAIN.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3206

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 ANKARA 2904

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DEPARTMENT PASS ATHENS AND NICOSIA AS DESIRED

FROM AMBASSADOR

10. THE BREAKDOWN OF THE TALKS WAS MAKARIOS' OBJECTIVE, CAGLAYANGIL SAID. HE NOTED THAT THE GREEK-CYPRIOTS STILL HAVE NOT STATED THEIR VIEWS ON TERRITORY AND EVEN IN THEIR RECENT PROPOSALS, THEY SAID THEY WERE ACCEPTING AN ALLEGED SUGGESTION BY THE UNSYG. IT WAS NOT THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S PROPOSAL AND THE LATTER HAD SO STATED. DENKTASH HAD CALLED ON THE GREEK-CYPRIOTS TO GIVE HIM A PROPOSAL WHICH WAS THE GREEK-CYPRIOTS OWN PROPOSAL, REGARDLESS OF ITS SUBSTANCE. BUT THE GREEK-CYPRIOTS HAD REFUSED AND IT HAD BECOME CLEAR THAT THEY DIDYNOT WANT AN AGREEMENT. HMR, HE ASSERTED, DID THE GREEK GOVERNMENT WANT AN AGREEMENT.

11. CAGLAYANGIL THEN AFFIRMED THAT NEVERTHELESS, THE TURKISH

GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE PREVENTED FROM CONTINUING TO DEMONSTRATE GOOD WILL, AND IT WOULD CONTINUE PURSUING THE PRINCIPLE ISSUES. HE SAID THE GOT HAD INSTRUCTED DENKTASH TO CONTINUE APPEALING TO THE GREEK-CYPRIOIS TO MAKE OFFERS AND TO URGE THEM TO NEGOTIATE. " WE WILL BE CALM AND STEADY," HE SAID, "AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO SEEK TO NEGOTIATE NO MATTER WHAT THE PROVOCATION FROM THE GREEK SIDE." HE ASKED ME TO STRESS TO THE SECRETARY THAT THIS TURKISH POLICY OF WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE WOULD BE MAINTAINED.

12. RETURNING TO THE SUBJECT OF BITSIOS' VISIT TO WASHINGTON,
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CAGLAYANGIL SAID: " I REQUEST THAT DURING THIS MEETING YOUR GOVERNMENT REFRAIN FROM ACTIONS THAT WILL CAUSE TURMOIL IN TURKISH PUBLIC OPINION AND WILL CAUSE GRIEVOUS DAMAGE TO THIS FRAIL CHILD WE CALL US-TURKISH RELATIONS, A CHILD WE ARE TRYING TO NOURISH BACK TO HEALTH."

13. RECAPITULATING, THE FONMIN SAID THAT HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR THE SECRETARY'S MESSAGE AND THAT, UNLIKE THE GOG, HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD BE GLAD TO SEE ACTION THAT WOULD STRENGTHEN NATO'S SOUTHEASTERN FLANK. ON THE OTHER HAND, WHILE HE WELCOMED THE SECRETARY'S STATEMENT THAT THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF AID FOR GREECE WOULD BE LESS THAN THAT FOR TURKEY, HE STRESSED THE ESSENTIALITY OF OUR DEFENSE SUPPORT BEING IN FACT PROPORTIONATE, NOT JUST LESS. THE GREEK REACTION TO THE US-TURKISH AGREEMENT WAS OBVIOUSLY
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MTILE, AND NOW THE GOG WAS NO LONGER MAKING ANY EFFORT TO HIDE THE FACT THAT IT WAS BEHIND THE EMBARGO. FOR THE SAKE OF BOTH TURKISH-GREEK RELATIONS AND US-TURKISH RELATIONS, THESE TWO RELATIONSHIPS MUST BE DIVORCED FROM EACH OTHER. HE CONCLUDED BY REEMPHASIZING THAT IT WAS OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE THAT THERE BE NO PUBLIC STATEMENT IMPLYING THERE WAS A LINK BETWEEN CYPRUS AND US MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY, SINCE EITHER THIS OR A DISPROPORTIONATE GREEK AID LEVEL FIGURE WOULD LIKELY MEAN THE REJECTION OF THE NEW AGREEMENT BY THE TURKISH PARLIAMENT.

14. IN RESPONSE TO THIS LENGTHY STATEMENT, I MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS. FIRST, AS REGARDS THE DECISION TO PRESENT THE AGREEMENT TO THE TURKISH PARLIAMENT, THE USG CONSIDERED THAT AS AN INTERNAL MATTER FOR THE GOT TO DECIDE AND WE WOULD RESPECT ANY DECISION IT HAD REACHED. WITH REGARD TO HIS CONCERN ABOUT A SEEMING LINK IN THE SECRETARY'S RECENT MESSAGE BETWEEN CYPRUS AND US ASSISTANCE, I NOTED THAT THE USG FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE GOT'S STRONG FEELINGS ON THIS POINT. I NOTED FURTHER THAT IN THE PAST WE HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO THE GOT THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO MAKE A MAJOR EFFORT TO HAVE THE EMBARGO REVERSED IRRESPECTIVE OF DEVELOPMENTS

ON CYPRUS AND THAT WE WERE NOW PREPARED TO BATTLE FOR
ACCEPTANCE OF THE NEW AGREEMENT ON ITS OWN MERITS, I.E. ON
THE BASIS OF ITS IMPORTANCE TO US, AREA, AND FREE WORLD SECURITY
INTERESTS. ON THE OTHER HAND, I SAID THAT AS A PRACTICAL

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MATTER THE TWO ISSUES WERE INTERTWINED IN MUCH CONGRESSIONAL
THINKING, AND WE HAD TO CONTINUE TO TAKE THIS INTO ACCOUNT.
MOVEROVER, THE USG WOULD OF NECESSITY HAVE TO CONTINUE
TO PRESS FOR PROGRESS ON CYPRUS, IRRESPECTIVE OF CONGRESSIONAL
CONSIDERATIONS, BECAUSE THE CYPRUS PROBLEM BORE SO DIRECTLY
ON THE OVERALL SECURITY AND STABILITY OF THIS END OF THE
MEDITERRANEAN.

15. AS REGARDS THE MINISTER'S CONCERN OVER THE URGENCY
WITH WHICH WE HAD APPROACHED THE GREEK AGREEMENT, I SAID
THAT THE US OBJECTIVE WAS TO REBUILD THE SECURITY OF THIS REGION,
AND THAT WE FELT IT WAS EQUALLY NECESSARY AND EQUALLY URGENT
TO REVITALIZE OUR SECURITY RELATIONS WITH BOTH GREECE AND
TURKEY. WE THEREFOR WANTED TO GET MOVING IN BOTH COUNTRIES
AS SOON AS WE COULD. THE MINISTER RESPONDED THAT HIS MOTIVE
IN COMMENTING ON THE URGENCY WAS NOT JEALOUSY OVER GREEK-US
RAPPROCHEMENT BUT JEALOUSY OVER THE FUTURE WELL-BEING OF
TURKISH-US RELATIONS.

16. TURNING TO THE CYPRUS ISSUE, I SAID I WAS ENCOURAGED BY
THE ATTITUDE THE MINISTER HAD EXPRESSED REGARDING THE NEGOTIATING
PROCESS. I SAID I HOPED THAT DESPITE THE DISCOURAGING EVENTS
OF THE LAST WEEK, A WAY COULD BE FOUND TO AVOID AN IMPASSE
IN THE INTER-COMMUNAL TALKS AND TO KEEP NEGOTIATIONS GOING
FOWARD. I ASKED WHY THE TURKISH-CYPRIOT NEGOTIATOR COULD
NOT ACCEPT THE SUBSTANCE OF THE GREEK-CYPRIOT PROPOSAL FOR
CONSIDERATION INSTEAD OF INSISTING ON THE PROCEDURAL
ALTERATION OF HAVING THE REFERENCE TO THE SECRETARY
GENERAL REMOVED AND THE PROPOSAL RESUBMITTED AS TOTALLY
GREEK-CYPRIOT. THE MINISTER SAID THAT THIS WOULD BE OUT OF
THE QUESTION BECAUSE THE GREEK-CYPRIOTS WER ACTING ON THE
BASIS THAT ANY PROPOSAL THEY MADE ON TERRITORY, REGARDLESS
OF ITS FORM OR CONTENT, WOULD INVOLVE THEM IN ACCEPTING A
BIZONAL SOLUTION. THAT IS THEKEY, HE SAID. WHETHER THE
GREEK-CYPRIOTS OFFERED TWENTY PERCENT OR ONE PERCENT IN THEIR
PROPOSAL WAS IMMATERIAL SO LONG AS THEY PRESENTED IT AS THEIR
OWN POSITION--NOT THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S --AND AS LONG
AS THEY COUPLED IT WITH A BALANCING AGREEMENT ON THEIR PART
FOR A BIZONAL SOLUTION. AT THIS POINT I ASKED WHY THEN
INSTEAD OF PERSISTING ON THIS PROCEDURAL ALTERATION BY THE
GREEKS--WHICH FRANKLY LOOKED LIKE THE TURKS ONCE MORE WERE

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SIMPLY USING A STALLING TACTIC--COULD NOT THE TURK SIDE
SIMPLY SAY THAT IT WAS PREPARED TO DISCUSS ANY TERRITORIAL
SUGGESTIONS MADE BY THE GREEK SIDE PROVIDED THESE WERE
COUPLED, AS A QUID PRO QUO, BY A GREEK OFFER TO ACCEPT A
BIZONAL SOLUTION. THE MINISTER SAID HE WOULD BE
PREPARED TO MAKE SUCH A STATEMENT, AND I URGED HIM TO SEIZE
A EARLY OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO. (EKREM GUVENDIREN, DEPUTY
MFA DIRECTOR FOR CYPRUS-GREEK AFFAIRS, WHO WAS PRESENT
THROUGHOUT OUR MEETING, NOTICEABLY WINCED WHEN THE MINISTER
SAID THIS, AND I SUSPECT WILLSEEK TO TALK HIM OUT OF IT.)

17. AT THIS POINT, CAGLAYANGIL LEFT THE ROOM AND IN A FEW
MOMENTS CAME BACK CARRYING A HUGE WALL MAP OF THE AEGEAN.
HE THEN STOOD UP CLOSE TO THE MAP, PUT HIS ARM OVER THE
STRING OF GREEK ISLANDS LYING JUST OFF THE TURKISH COAST AND
SHOWED HOW HIS ARM POSITIONED IN THIS WAY " EMBRACED" THE
TURKISH MAINLAND. REMINING BENT INTO THIS POSITION, HE
STRESSED OVER HIS SHOULDER THAT THIS EMBRACE WAS " TOO WARM,
TOO CLOSE." THE SCALE OF THE MAP WAS SUCH THAT HIS UPPER
ARM AND FOREARM CIRCLED THE TURKISH AEGEAN AND
MEDITERRANEAN COASTS AND HIS HAND THEN FELL NATURALLY ON
CYPRUS. SLAPPING HIS HAND DOWN ON THE ISLAND, HE SAID
CYPRUS IS THE FINAL, UNACCEPTABLE, EXTENSION OF AN ALREADY
UNACCEPTABLE EMBRACE. THEN IN AN INCREASINGLY AGITATED
MOOD, HE LEFT THE LARGER MAP AND PRODUCED TWO SMALLER
PAPER MAPS (BOTH OF WHICH ARE WELL KNOWN TO THE DEPARTMENT),
GRAPHICALLY ILLUSTRATING THAT IF GREEK TERRITORIAL WATERS ARE
INCREASED TO TWELVE MILES, TURKEY WOULD HAVE NO REPEAT NO ACCESS
TO THE OPEN SEA. THEN, HIS BITTER AND EMOTIONAL MOOD CONTINUING,
HE SAID " YOUR GOVERNMENT MUST UNDERSTAND, AND THE GREEKS MUST
UNDERSTAND, THAT THESE ARE GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS THAT GO TO THE
HEART OF TURKISH NATIONAL SURVIVAL AND THAT AS FAR AS TURKEY
IS CONCERNED, CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES ARE IRRELEVANT. IT IS
NOT A MATTER TO BE DETERMINED BY GREEK LOBBYING IN THE
AMERICAN CONGRESS.

18. THEN, CONTINUING ON THE SUBJECT OF LOBBING IN CONGRESS,
CAGLAYANGIL SAID THAT THE GREEK GOVERNMENT KNEW WELL THAT
IF THE NEW TURKISH-US SECURITY AGREEMENT WERE NOT ENDORSED
BY THE CONGRESS, THE RESULTANT BREAK IN US-TURKISH RELATIONS
WOULD BE IRREPARABLE. THUS, HE ASSERTED, THE OBJECTIVES OF
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THE COMMUNISTS AND THE GREEK LOBBY ARE THE SAME. ON THIS
BITTERNOTE, HE TERMINATED THIS PORTION OF OUR CONVERSATION.
WE THEN TURNED TO OTHER SUBJECTS BEING SEPARATELY REPORTED.
MACOMBER

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